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The Simon effect refers to an incompatibility between stimulus and response locations
resulting in a conflict situation and, consequently, slower responses. Like other conflict
effects, it is commonly reduced after repetitions, suggesting an executive control ability,
which flexibly rewires cognitive processing and adapts to conflict. Interestingly, conflict is
not necessarily individually defined: the Social Simon effect refers to a scenario where two
people who share a task show a conflict effect where a single person does not. Recent
studies showed these observations might converge into what could be called vicarious
conflict adaptation, with evidence indicating that observing someone else’s conflict may
subsequently reduce one’s own. While plausible, there is reason for doubt: both the
social aspect of the Simon Effect, and the degree to which executive control accounts
for the conflict adaptation effect, have become foci of debate in recent studies. Here, we
present two experiments that were designed to test the social dimension of the effect
by varying the social relationship between the actor and the co-actor. In Experiment
1, participants performed a conflict task with a virtual co-actor, while the actor-observer
relationship was manipulated as a function of the similarity between response modalities.
In Experiment 2, the same task was performed both with a virtual and with a human
co-actor, while heart-rate measurements were taken to measure the impact of observed
conflict on autonomous activity. While both experiments replicated the interpersonal
conflict adaptation effects, neither showed evidence of the critical social dimension. We
consider the findings as demonstrating that vicarious conflict adaptation does not rely
on the social relationship between the actor and co-actor.
Keywords: executive control, conflict adaptation, joint attention, Simon effect, task co-representation, social
cognition, ECG
INTRODUCTION
Everyday life often requires us to resist temptations that would otherwise distract us from reaching
certain goals. Conflict tasks demonstrate the extent to which we find distractions difficult to deal
with, or in other words, define how much executive control we need to fulfill task demands. Such
tasks include those ones that measure some of the most well-known effects in psychology, for
example the Stroop and the Eriksen effects (Stroop, 1935; Eriksen and Eriksen, 1974). Both effects
demonstrate the cost of being required to ignore a salient part of the stimulus, i.e., word identities
and flanking stimuli. Cognitive control allows us to counter the tempting automaticity, or unravel
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the confusing interference, so that we may ultimately respond in
accordance with the set task goals.
The Simon effect refers to the observation that choice reaction
times are delayed if the response location and stimulus location
do not correspond (Simon and Rudell, 1967). For example, if a
cue such as an arrow pointing left—prompting a left response—
is presented on the right side of the screen, it tends to result
in a slower, more likely erroneous, response than if it had
been presented on the left side. The original explanation of the
effect was that it was caused by an automatic tendency to act
toward the source of the stimulation (Simon, 1969), although
later studies showed that spatial cues do not necessarily attract
corresponding responses. In day-to-day life, the consequences
of our actions appear where we perform them, causing us to
associate actions with corresponding locations. However, after
training participants to associate left responses with right-sided
action-effects (the appearance of a light on the right side),
Hommel (1993) reported inverted Simon effects. Thus, it appears
that the appearance of a stimulus primes the intention to act
in such a way that has been associated with the action-effect,
causing response latency if perception and intention locations do
not correspond.
Whatever the source of the conflict, an interesting finding is
that conflict effects tend to become smaller after repetition. Thus,
across many trials, the higher the proportion of incongruent
Stroop stimuli among them, the smaller the effect (Logan and
Zbrodoff, 1979), an effect now often referred to as the proportion
congruent effect (Lowe and Mitterer, 1982). However, even after
a single incongruent Eriksen trial, the subsequent incongruence
tends to be resolved faster (Gratton et al., 1992). Likewise with
the Simon Effect: if one is to respond left to circles and right to
squares, a circle appearing right will constitute a response conflict
and, accordingly, slower reactions. The conflict adaption effect
(CAE, also called Gratton or sequential compatibility modulation
effect) refers to the simple observation that a subsequent square
left becomes easier to respond to (e.g., Hommel et al., 2004).
Social Adaptation of Conflict Control
Interference and inhibition have been considered the
mechanisms underlying conflict effects since their first
conceptualization (Stroop, 1935, already noted both
possibilities), so it is not so strange that such higher order
functions are normally invoked by CAE models as well. Broadly
speaking, the influential conflict monitoring model (Botvinick
et al., 1999, 2001; Botvinick, 2007) as well as models involving
inhibitory mechanisms (e.g., Stürmer et al., 2002) rely on dual
stimulus-response routes of automaticity and control. A conflict
trial such as the previously mentioned circle located right is
processed via the automatic, right-location right-response
route. In parallel, a controlled route uses the task instructions
to infer the correct, left response from the circular shape.
The simultaneously activated response codes are detected, for
example in the anterior cingulate cortex (van Veen et al., 2001;
Yeung et al., 2004), which prompt the system to engage executive
control. This system may then resolve the incompatibility
either by facilitating the controlled route or by inhibiting the
automatic one. Following successful resolution, one’s cognitive
state remains prepared for further conflict, and it follows that
later conflict effects are smaller.
Although these mechanisms that account for the Simon Effect
are normally bound within individuals, a recent modification of
the task suggests the effect can also be measured between people.
That is, it was noted that if one person is asked to respond solely
to the occurrence of a single type of stimulus (e.g., circles), the
task effectively becomes a go/no-go task and the Simon Effect
disappears. The Social Simon Effect then refers to the observation
that if another person (the co-actor) is seated at the same desk and
asked to share the task by taking care of the other stimulus (e.g.,
respond right to squares), the Simon Effect reappears (Sebanz
et al., 2003). This has been interpreted as a type of shared task-
representation, suggesting we effectively “co-represent” the task
of the other person, and that perhaps we, on a representational
level, do not even separate between the actions of ourselves and
those others who share our task (Knoblich and Sebanz, 2006).
If we combine the ideas behind the CAE and the social
Simon Effect, the result could be called a social, or vicarious
conflict adaptation effect. Indeed, it would make strategic sense
for one to incorporate observed conflict from another person
in order to achieve control over one’s own task. Although
the effect has not yet been as widely investigated as the CAE
or the social Simon Effect, two recent studies indicate that
the prediction holds. Winkel et al. (2009) used a modified
version of the Simon task and pre-cued left and right located
colored circles preceded by a name, to cue the responder in
the present trial. Response-feedback was displayed using virtual
buttons so that the participant (the actor) could see the actions
of someone else (the co-actor). Confirming the hypothesis of
vicarious conflict adaptation, they observed reduced conflict
effects after merely observing the conflict of the co-actor. They
presented collaborating evidence using event related potentials
(Winkel et al., 2009) and fMRI (Winkel et al., 2012) to suggest
another person’s conflict is mentally represented like one’s own.
In other words, a task co-representation may lead to conflict
co-representation, so that to a certain extent one is aﬄicted by
observing a co-actor’s conflict and is able to learn from this.
Feature Repetition Effects and Referential
Coding
Yet, a significant body of research suggests that neither the
control account for the adaptation effect nor the task co-
representation account for the Social Simon Effect is without
its critics. In terms of the former, lower level feature repetition
effects can to a large extent account for conflict adaptation
without invoking additional, higher cognitive functions.
That is, conflict repetition (incompatible-incompatible, iI,
trial sequences) can involve complete stimulus-response
repetitions. Stimulus-response repetitions naturally result in
priming effects and, consequently, improved performance
may be expected (Mayr et al., 2003). On the other hand, both
compatible-incompatible (cI) and incompatible-compatible (iC)
trial sequences normally involve a partial change of features,
which gives rise to delayed responses in a variety of scenarios
(Hommel et al., 2001). Together, these observations account
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for a significant part of the total variance involved in conflict
adaptation effects (Hommel et al., 2004). Various strategies for
disentangling feature effects from conflict adaptation effects have
been proposed, for example by excluding repetitions (Wühr and
Ansorge, 2005) or by regression (Notebaert and Verguts, 2007).
However, whether such attempts have been successful remains a
critical point of debate (Schmidt et al., 2014, 2015).
While the main debate is beyond the scope of the present
study, one of its pivotal points lead directly to the present
study and will therefore be explained in more detail. That is, if
conflict adaptation is the result of a domain general facilitation
of attention, then a change in the task, especially if the change
is irrelevant, should matter little. However, a change in tasks
can remove adaptation effects (Notebaert and Verguts, 2008),
and even changes within the same task that are unrelated to
conflict can largely eliminate adaptation effects. Thus, Spapé
and Hommel (2008) asked participants to respond by saying
“high” to high tones and “low” to low tones while listening to
task irrelevant voices saying “high” or “low.” Stroop-like effects
were found with incongruent tone–word combinations and,
unsurprisingly, this conflict effect was smaller after repeating
conflict in incompatible-incompatible (iI) sequences. If, however,
the voice changed between two trials, for example from a
male to a female voice, then this conflict adaptation effect was
removed. Spapé and Hommel (2008) interpreted the findings
as suggesting that the change in voice disrupted episodic recall,
thereby eliminating sequence repetition effects. Other irrelevant
changes, such as a rotating display of Simon stimuli (Spapé
et al., 2011; Spape and Hommel, 2014) or a change in a self-
representing cartoon figure portrayed next to a task (Spapé et al.,
2015a) were likewise found to strongly disrupt conflict adaptation
effects.
As with pure executive control accounts for conflict
adaptation, so too does the higher-level task co-representation
account of the Social Simon Effect come with its share of
controversy. If, as has been suggested, the Social Simon Effect
depends on representing another’s task, then the social definition
of the task should be important, while changes in the physical
aspect of the task should not have any major effects. However,
the degree to which the co-actor collaborated in the task had
no effect on the Simon Effect, while a large enough co-actor to
actor distance eliminated it (Guagnano et al., 2010). Thus, a more
parsimonious interpretation of the Social Simon Effect is that the
mere presence of salient spatial events can change the reference
point in how we spatially represent our own actions (Dolk et al.,
2013). This makes the effect “social” to the extent that it implies
that the presence of another person is salient enough to affect
one’s own task, but this is a much weaker stance than the notion
of task co-presentation (Dolk et al., 2011).
In sum, the idea that we may represent another person’s
conflict just like our own and then apply the co-represented
conflict to our executive control, is less plausible than it
intuitively appears. Even seemingly trivial changes can eliminate
conflict adaptation, and a switch between two people is, at least
physically, a clear change in a task-relevant feature. The more
extreme interpretation of the Social Simon Effect could argue
that we are psychologically blind to such changes, since we
co-represent the co-actor’s task (Sebanz et al., 2003). However,
the evidence for task co-representation no longer seems clear-cut,
either.
EXPERIMENT 1: EFFECTS OF ACTION
EFFECTOR ON SOCIAL CONFLICT
ADAPTATION
In order to investigate whether observing a co-actor’s conflict
is like experiencing our own, we first attempted to replicate
the effects found by Winkel et al. (2009, 2012). We maintained
most aspects of the task, but slightly modified it to be more
consistent with standard Simon tasks. Importantly, we improved
trial-to-trial consistency by assigning colors to participants and
applying these colors to the fixation cross (see Figure 1) to
indicate the turn rather than showing the participant’s name.
We also enhanced the virtual presence of the co-actor by using
photographs of hands, instead of relying on abstract, blinking
rectangles.
Additionally, we investigated whether the similarity between
the actor and co-actor’s action responses affected the vicarious
conflict adaptation effect. As described earlier, the association
between the response and the anticipated consequences is
particularly important for the Simon effect. According to the
ideomotor theory of action control, this is because we represent
actions by their anticipated consequences (Elsner and Hommel,
2001; Hommel et al., 2001). In theory, then, the degree to
which the participant’s action-effects correspond to the co-actors
action-effects should determine the degree to which task co-
representation can occur. If the effect observed by Winkel et al.
is based on task co-representation induced conflict adaptation,
we would predict that action-effect correspondence should
determine the degree to which conflict may “travel” from one
person to the next.
Indeed, some recent studies suggested this to be likely. In
the Social Transfer of Learning paradigm (Milanese et al., 2010),
participants perform a spatial incompatibility task to associate
stimulus-locations with the inverse response-locations, before
engaging in a Simon task. Interestingly, several social versions of
the task have demonstrated that the social and spatial relationship
between pairs of participants can have dramatic effects on
performance. For example, Iani et al. (2013) asked participants
merely to observe computer-generated incompatible responses
(i.e., from a virtual co-actor). If, during this time, participants
were potentially able to act, a type of observational learning
was found, transferring to a subsequent Simon task that showed
smaller incompatibility effects. Likewise, in a joint version of
the task, it was found that the inverse compatibility association
carried over to a social Simon Effect, unless participants switched
seats before engaging with the Simon task (Ferraro et al.,
2012).
It should be underlined that the focus of the present study
is not on the Simon effect as such, but on conflict adaptation.
Specifically, we are interested in the degree to which observed
actions are represented: if action observation is processed to the
extent that it can constitute self-experienced conflict, it should
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FIGURE 1 | Trial procedure. The color of the fixation was used to cue the actor of the present trial. An arrow-like stimulus then appeared, positioned slightly to the
left or right of the fixation, pointing toward a left (<) or right (>) finger response. The hand used by the actor (action effector) was either the same or different: here, the
participant (upper panels) used the left hand and the co-actor (PC, lower panels) used the right hand. If the response-location corresponded to the stimulus-location,
the trial was compatible (upper panels), otherwise the trial was incompatible (lower panels). Upon the participant’s or co-actors reaction, the hand-pictures were
adjusted to simulate the pressing of the button.
modify our own conflict resolution. However, this modulation
of conflict adaptation itself should be susceptible to aspects that
have been found to affect the social Simon Effect and social
transfer of learning.
Thus, we expected that if we represent another’s action using
our own motor repertoire, then we would expect the degree
to which the other’s task representation overlaps with one’s
own to be of critical importance. That is, if two persons have
completely different response modalities (e.g., one performs it
with their hands, the other with their feet), neither a mirror
neuron (Rizzolatti et al., 1996) nor an action co-representation
(Sebanz et al., 2003) model would predict simulation of the
other’s response. Similarly (though perhaps not as strongly as a
hand-to-foot transfer), we expected that if the virtual other used
a different hand, the vicarious conflict adaptation effect should be
reduced.
Methods
Participants
Participants were recruited from the student andmembers of staff
populations at Aalto University, Finland. Six female and 10 male
volunteers, age 27.0 ± 3.12 years, participated in the experiment
in exchange for one cinema ticket. They were fully informed on
the nature and procedure of the experiment and, in accordance
with the Declaration of Helsinki, signed informed consent forms
prior to their participation. One (male, age 27) participant was
found to have less than 50% correct reactions in one condition
and was removed from further analysis.
Apparatus and Stimuli
Experiment design, stimulus display and response collection
were conducted using E-Prime 2.0.10.242 professional
(Psychology Software Tools, Sharpsburg, PA, USA), running
on a Lenovo ThinkPad X1 laptop computer under Microsoft
Windows 7 Enterprise x64 SP1. The 14′′ display was set to a
resolution of 1366 × 768 pixels and a refresh-rate of 60Hz.
Animations of hands were obtained from the first author, who
filmed the bending of the index and middle fingers of his left
hand and took stills of the extreme points of the movement
(see Figure 1) to suggest exaggerated, but clear, button presses.
The three pictures (no button pressed, left button pressed,
right button pressed) were then horizontally mirrored to
create equivalent right-handed pictures and scaled to a size
corresponding to a size of 243 × 384 pixels. Response cues
consisted of left and right-pointing arrows between two flanking
crosses: X < X prompting a left-, and X > X prompting a right
finger response. They were positioned 5% (68 pixels) either to
the left or right of the center of the screen.
Procedure
After receiving written and verbal instructions, the participants
completed at least 16 trials to familiarize themselves with the
task. Only after they indicated they were confident of their
understanding of the task did the experiment commence. At the
beginning of each block, the participants were instructed to use
either the left (Q and W keys) or the right (O and P keys) hand,
though they were asked to keep the other hand on the keyboard
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as well. As schematically displayed in Figure 1, each trial would
begin with a fixation crosshair displayed at the center of the
screen for 600–1000ms (random). The fixation was either red
or green, indicating who was responsible for the present trial.
Participants were instructed to only respond during this trial if
it was “their” color (green or red, counterbalanced). Following, a
left or right response cue was displayed to the left- or right- side,
until a response was made. Pressing a button would replace the
picture of the corresponding hand with one in which the button
was shown as pressed. Releasing the button would immediately
reset the picture to its default (no button pressed) state. This was
shown for a further inter-trial interval (ITI) of 500ms, unless
the participant reacted before the onset of the response cue,
1000ms after the response cue, or incorrectly, at which point the
following feedback was displayed during the ITI: “:(Too early,”
“:(Too late,” or “:(Wrong.” The entire experiment took 27.5 ±
3.3min on average. In conditions in which the participant was
instructed to not respond, a virtual response was displayed using
the same method as described for the actual participant, with
an animation start pre-programmed to commence at the time
calculated as the average of the reaction times collected up to
that point ± 50ms, with a button-press duration of 80–150ms.
The virtual participant responded incorrectly at a fixed rate of
1/9 responses to more accurately suggest the behavior of real
co-actors.
Design
The manual similarity between the actual and virtual participant
was varied over 4, randomly ordered, blocks, resulting from the
intermixing of the participant’s active hand (left or right) and
the virtual participant’s active hand. Thus, in half the blocks,
the action effector of the virtual other was the opposite hand
(as in Figure 1) and in the other half, it was the same hand.
Each block consisted of 144 trials, designed as 128 trials that
were randomized as 64 types of trial pairs across the 4 location
(L->L, L->R, R->L, R->R), colors/turns response sequences
(2 × 4 × 4 × 4 = 128). Another 16 trials were drawn from
a similar sample, with the exception that in these trials, the
virtual co-actor was programmed to make an error. The trial-pair
paradigm was used as half-way in between the S1/S2 paradigm
of feature integration/conflict adaptation designs (c.f. Spapé and
Hommel, 2008) and those applying sampling with replacement
(Blais, 2008).
The analysis involved a four-way repeated measures analysis
of variance (ANOVA) on the reaction times (RTs) with hand
(same vs. different hand), previous actor (same vs. different
person), previous compatibility (compatible c vs. incompatible
i), and current compatibility (C vs. I) as factors. However, this
analysis can only show whether conflict adaptation changes, not
whether there is any remaining. We therefore also tested whether
vicarious conflict adaptation was observed by first calculating the
conflict adaptation effect (CAE) for each condition using CAE=
(cI–cC) – (iI–iC) and then testing these scores against 0. We
analyzed the errors in the same way, but as we had no a priori
reason to suspect errors should have a different effect, we only
report on them if they show divergence from the reaction times,
since this could indicate possible speed-accuracy trade-offs.
Results
Repeated measures ANOVAs testing the hypothesized effect of
similarity in action effector between the participant and the
virtual participant showed a main effect of current compatibility
(i.e., Simon effect), F(1, 14) = 27.61, p < 0.001, η
2
p = 0.66, and
a main effect of previous actor, F(1, 14) = 5.59, p < 0.04, η
2
p =
0.29, with incompatible trials being 24ms slower than compatible
trials, and trials following the other actor being 9ms faster than
those following the same actor. The other main effects, of hand,
F(1, 14) = 0.43, p > 0.5, η
2
p = 0.03, and previous compatibility,
F(1, 14) = 2.55, p > 0.13, η
2
p = 0.15 were both insignificant. A
significant interaction between current compatibility and previous
compatibility, F(1, 14) = 87.33, p < 0.001, η
2
p = 0.86, was
observed, indicative of a CAE. That is, after compatible trials,
incompatible trials were ca. 50ms slower than compatible trials,
whereas after incompatible trials, this difference was reduced
to 1ms. Furthermore, a three-way interaction between previous
actor, previous compatibility and current compatibility was found,
F(1, 14) = 11.85, p < 0.004, η
2
p = 0.46. The direction of
the effect could be described in a reduction of the CAE if the
previous trial was performed by a different actor (see Table 1).
However, this effect was not found to be affected by the similarity
between observation and execution, as the four-way interaction
between hand, previous actor, previous compatibility and current
compatibility, was insignificant, F(1, 14) = 0.07, p > 0.7, η
2
p <
0.01. No other interaction in the entire factorial design was found
significant (ps> 0.09, Fs< 3.4).
Thus, as summarized also in Figure 2, a substantial conflict
adaptation effect was observed within the same subject. This
effect was reduced by up to 72% following trials of the other actor.
All CAEs, including those following trials from the other actor
were significantly above 0, ts (14) > 2.7, ps < 0.02, suggesting
perhaps a vicarious conflict adaptation exists. However, as hand
did not enter into any interaction, we found no evidence
suggesting that the similarity between action effects had an effect
on this vicarious CAE. The CAE with different actors with same
TABLE 1 | Results Experiment 1.
Action effector/ Previous c i CAE
hand co-actor
cC cI iC iI
REACTION TIME (ms)
Same Same 477 (15) 541 (12) 520 (15) 506 (14) 78 (15)
Different 472 (15) 513 (15) 496 (14) 503 (15) 33 (11)
Different Same 475 (15) 535 (12) 517 (15) 504 (17) 73 (15)
Different 486 (12) 521 (14) 498 (14) 511 (15) 22 (8)
ERROR (%)
Same Same 0.4 (0.4) 3.1 (1.1) 1.7 (1.4) 0.9 (0.6) 3.5 (1.2)
Different 0.6 (0.4) 2.1 (0.7) 1.1 (0.6) 0.3 (0.3) 2.3 (1.2)
Different Same 0.3 (0.3) 2.7 (1.2) 2.9 (1.3) 0.3 (0.3) 4.9 (1.7)
Different 1.1 (0.8) 1.4 (0.6) 0.7 (0.5) 0.9 (0.6) 0.1 (1.4)
Provided are means and standard errors of means for each design cell. The conflict
adaptation effect (CAE) is computed as a function of the effect of preceding compatibility
(c) or incompatibility (i) on current compatibility (C) or incompatibility (I).
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hands (the third bar in Figure 2) also did significantly differ from
the CAE with different actors with different hands (the fourth
bar), t(14) = 0.99, p > 0.3.
Conclusion
The experiment replicated the vicarious conflict adaptation
effect of a similar magnitude to that observed by Winkel et al.
(2012), but two troublesome observations can be made. First,
while observing conflict from the virtual other was shown to
affect one’s own compatibility resolution, it was not quite like
undergoing the incompatibility oneself. In fact, after observing,
the conflict adaptation effect was only about one third of that
after the performing condition. Second, no effect whatsoever
was observed regarding the similarity of action effector (same
or different hand) between the human and the virtual co-actor.
Apparently, the action effector—i.e., the way another “dealt with”
the conflict—matters little, suggesting little regard of how the
other’s conflict is represented.
An inter-individual effect remains, however, but this would be
expected even without any social requirement. That is, if we focus
purely on the compatibility sequence from an egocentric point of
view, one could summarize an observed trial as similar to one
in which a stimulus is shown without response requirement. In
this way, both this Experiment and the Winkel et al. studies are
similar to Hommel et al. (2004)’s Experiment 3. They showed
sequential conflict effects occurring even with pairs of trials in
which no response was executed on the first trial, just as is
the case here. The difference between acting and observing is
confounded with the difference between responding and not
responding.
In other words, some CAE, even during pure observation,
may be expected without social effect. Thus, to answer whether
there is any vicarious conflict adaptation, one should go beyond
the mere observance of sequential compatibility effects between
different persons and provide positive evidence that the social
relationship between actor and co-actor modulates the vicarious
CAE. Experiment 1 failed to show that the resemblance between
actor and co-actor had any effect. Could it be that people simply
did not observe the virtual co-actor? This seems unlikely since
some vicarious CAE remained. On the other hand, it is possible
that the action-effects used here were insufficiently salient in
their differences. This seems a reasonable assumption in light of
the description of actions: observing the right hand performing
an index-fingered response may well have been perceived as a
left-sided response.
Of course, a critical difference between Experiment 1 and
the studies by Winkel et al. (2012) was that, here, no deception
took place: the fact that the virtual actions were computer-
generated was entirely clear. Why would someone care about the
computer experiencing a conflict? Winkel et al. (2012) clearly
found this to be a pertinent question as well, as they took care
to make sure participants incorrectly attributed the co-actor’s
responses to a human being. Furthermore, after completing
the experiment, they verified whether participants had seen
through the deception (although this was dropped from the
analysis). In order, then, to establish whether the effect under
investigation is social in nature, it is necessary to show evidence
that our conceptualization of who the other is, has a measurable
impact.
EXPERIMENT 2: REAL AND VIRTUAL
OTHERS IN VICARIOUS CONFLICT
ADAPTATION
In Experiment 2, we decided to directly test the effect of the
social dimension on the vicarious CAE by recruiting pairs of
subjects. Most other aspects of the experiment were the same,
but with several improvements resulting from observations made
in Experiment 1. We also added physiological recordings to
provide further information on conflict processing, particularly
with others.
To provide a true test of the social dimension of the effect, we
directly tested the “belief” in the other player. To this end, we
FIGURE 2 | Sequential compatibility effects within and between actors in Experiment 1. The first two panels show reaction times for compatible (C) and
incompatible (I) trials as a function of preceding trial compatibility. In some trials, the previous actor was the participant him/herself (same actor), in the others, the
preceding trial concerned one in which a virtual co-actor responded (different actor). The right panels show the conflict adaptation effects, computed as the interaction
effect (cI–cC) – (iI–iC) for same-hand and different-hand trials as a function of previous actor. Error bars are standard errors of the mean CAE.
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assigned one fixation color to a participant, one to the computer
(as before) and one to another participant. Using dual screen
views in separate, neighboring cubicles, we tested the vicarious
CAE of each participant, both in self-to-self trials, in virtual co-
actor-to-self trials, and in human co-actor-to-self trials, obtaining
CAEs for each condition. Clearly, if vicarious conflict adaptation
is based on a strong form of action co-representation, one would
expect that the type of the other matters (Tsai and Brass, 2007;
Tsai et al., 2008). Specifically, there should be a clear difference
between virtual co-actor-to-self and other-human-to-self trials,
as we expected people to care less about computers than fellow
humans (e.g., Ravaja et al., 2006).
Furthermore, we improved the task based on the information
gained in Experiment 1. That is, as virtual errors showed
little overall effect and as participants did not excessively show
inaccurate behavior, we removed the virtual error-trials. We
based the virtual actions on the human actions by keeping a
standing average of each participant’s reaction time (independent
of condition). Furthermore, as the action effector had shown
very little effect in Experiment 1, we changed the task from
a two-finger unimodal version of the Simon task to a more
common single-finger bimodal one. This was expected to provide
greater salience to the common action-effects between actor
and observers. Secondly, this improved the similarity with
Winkel et al. (2009)’s design. Thus, the only real difference
between virtual and human co-actor scenarios was in the social
information regarding the co-actor.
Finally, we additionally acquired heart rate measurements.
Changes in autonomic activity, as measured with phasic heart
rate measurements, have previously been related to attention
regulation (Somsen et al., 2000), error monitoring (Hajcak et al.,
2003), and expectation violations (Crone et al., 2003). Thus, in
the somewhat rare situation that heart rate is taken into account
during a conflict task, Fiehler et al. (2004) found incompatible
flanker stimuli to evoke a cardiac deceleration from ca. 1 s after
onset. Like Winkel et al. (2009), who collected N2 responses in
the ERP, we expected this deceleration to provide information
on the degree to which incompatibility evoked an executive
response, not only while performing the task oneself, but also
while observing another’s performance. A strong stance on action
co-representation would predict CAEs on heart rate to occur
both while performing the task oneself, and while believing
someone else to perform the task, but not while knowing the
computer performs the task.
Methods
Participants
Thirteen days (N = 26, six female, six male, one mixed sex)
volunteered to take part in the experiment. Participants were
26.3 ± 2.6 years of age and received a cinema ticket as a
compensation for their time.
Apparatus and Stimuli
The same animations of hands as in Experiment 1 were used, but,
given the lack of results related to action effector, we used only the
index finger motions of the hands.
Procedure
Following instructions, participants were asked to choose a
color which would be used to represent themselves during the
experiment: red, green or blue. They received 16 training trials to
familiarize themselves with the task, after which they completed
six experimental blocks of trials. At the beginning of each block,
the color cues were used to identify who would participate in
the blocks. There were three types of blocks: they would either
participate with the other participant (human 1 with human 2
block), participate with the virtual co-actor (human 1 with PC
block), or passively observe the other participant with the virtual
co-actor (human 2 with PC). Both participants were instructed to
use the index fingers of two hands but different keys: one would
use the T and I keys for left and right response cues, the other
the G and K keys. The trial procedure was otherwise similar to
Experiment 1. Trials began with a fixation crosshair that was
either in red, green or blue, indicating whose “turn” it was to
respond. The entire experiment took 41.3± 6.6min to complete.
Full code for one version of the experiment is provided in the
Supplementary Information.
Physiological Data Processing
Continuous electrocardiography (ECG) was recorded via bipolar
electrodes placed above the manubrium and ninth left rib, and
digitized at 1000Hz using a QuickAmp (BrainProducts GmbH,
Gilching, Germany) amplifier. Further pre-processing was done
using Matlab (MathWorks, Natick, MA) tools, including filtering
the signal at<2 and>100Hz, with a notch filter at 50Hz. A local
peak detection algorithm was used to detect the R component in
the QRS complex of the ECG, which is typically of consistent and
high amplitude (here, a threshold of 75% to the median signal
was used). Detected peak intervals were then interpolated using
spline interpolation with occasionally missing (<2%) intervals
excluded. The resulting continuous inter-beat interval (IBI) in
milliseconds was then epoched, time-locked to the onset of the
critical stimulus onset with 1 s of baseline activity subtracted
from the subsequent 4.5 s. The average data was calculated
across participant’s (active) cC and cI trials (which normally
gives the strongest conflict effects) in 100ms bins. Inspection
of the grand average showed an initial cardiac deceleration,
likely related to the orienting response (Graham and Clifton,
1966), maximal at 11.2 1100ms after the stimulus onset for both
conditions. Contrasting the two conditions showed a significant
difference from 2200–3300ms [maximally significant at 2900ms,
t(23) = 3.11]. As the latency of acceleration and deceleration have
previously been shown to provide information on perceptual
processing and stimulus significance (Bradley, 2009), we used an
analysis with three bins to account for variability in the orienting
response, with windowed averages over 0–1100, 1100–2200, and
2200–3300.
Design
The type of other was varied between the three block types, with
the order randomized and repeating twice. Each block consisted
of 128 trials, with 64 types of sequences between two trials,
given 4 location, 4 response, and 4 color changes (e.g., red->red,
red->green, green->red, green->green).
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The analysis of reaction times was similar to Experiment 1,
but now with the type of other instead of action effector. Thus, a
single repeated measures ANOVA was used with type of other
(human co-actor vs. virtual co-actor), previous actor (same vs.
different person), previous compatibility (c vs. i), and current
compatibility (C vs. I) as factors. Following, we computed CAEs
for each combination of type of other and previous actor, testing
them against 0. The hypothesis that vicarious conflict adaptation
should be weaker if the other is known to be a virtual co-actor was
tested directly with a single paired T-test between the different
person CAEs for the human vs. virtual co-actor.
The analysis of cardiac changes was similar but included
separate five-factor ANOVAs for three distinct scenarios, with
for each the factors of type of other, previous actor, previous
compatibility, and current compatibility, as well as time (bin 1
vs. bin 2 vs. bin 3). The first scenario was similar to the RT
analysis, and concerned the trials in which the participant’s own
response was required. The second scenario concerned the same
blocks, in which the subject participated, but was not presently
responding. The third scenario described the situation in which
the participant was passively observing the other participant
responding. Note that in all three scenarios, the type of other is
either human or virtual, but with a slight change of meaning: the
other is (1) a co-actor (who is not currently acting); (2) a co-actor
(who is currently acting); or (3) a non-cooperative actor (who is
merely observed).
Results
Behavioral Effects
Repeated measures ANOVAs on RTs with type of other, previous
actor, previous compatibility, and current compatibility as factors
showed a significant effect of compatibility, F(1, 25) = 9.77, p =
0.004, η2p = 0.28, while type of other, F(1, 25) = 0.34, p > 0.5,
η
2
p = 0.01, previous actor, F(1, 25) = 0.94, p > 0.3, and previous
compatibility, F(1, 25) = 0.11, p > 0.7, η
2
p < 0.01, did not.
Three interactions were found significant. Previous compatibility
interacted with current compatibility, F(1, 25) = 86.52, p < 0.001,
η
2
p = 0.78, reflecting a reduction in the compatibility effect after
preceding incompatibility, i.e., a CAE. A significant three-way
interaction between previous actor, previous compatibility and
current compatibility, F(1, 25) = 32.31, p < 0.001, η
2
p = 0.56,
indicated that the CAE effect itself was modulated by previous
actor. Type of other interacted only with previous compatibility,
F(1, 25) = 8.67, p = 0.007: in PC trials, participants were 2ms
faster after compatible trials; in human trials, they were 8ms
slower. While of interest, this effect was not found to be related
to conflict adaptation. That is, neither the interaction between
type of other, previous compatibility, and current compatibility,
F(1, 25) = 0.42, p > 0.5, η
2
p = 0.02, nor the four-way interaction,
F(1, 25) = 0.42, p > 0.9, η
2
p < 0.01, was significant. In other
words, we found no evidence in favor of any effect of type of other
on the CAE.
As in Experiment 1, all CAEs were larger than 0, ps < 0.02,
and CAEs with the same actor were much (almost 5x) larger
than those with the different actors. However, as indicated by the
previously mentioned lack of effect of type of other on CAE, the
type of different co-actor did not affect CAEs: a simple post-hoc
T-test did not provide evidence that the CAE with a real co-actor
differed from the CAE with the virtual co-actor, t(25) = 0.41,
p > 0.6. CAEs with different actors (the third and fourth bars in
Figure 3) were also not significantly different from one another,
t(25) = 0.36, p > 0.7. An overview of the means and standard
errors of reaction times and error percentages for every cell in the
design is provided in Table 2.
Effects on Cardiac Response
We first tested whether the effects as observed in the reaction
times emerged also in terms of the cardiac response. In a five-
way repeated measures ANOVAwith time, type of other, previous
actor, previous compatibility, and current compatibility as factors,
time, F(2, 50) = 20.78, p < 0.001, η
2
p = 0.45, and previous actor,
FIGURE 3 | Conflict adaptation effects (CAEs) for virtual- and human
co-actor as a function of previous actor (same or different). CAEs were
calculated as the interaction term between preceding and current
(in)compatibility. Error bars are standard errors of the mean CAE.
TABLE 2 | Results Experiment 2.
Type of Previous c i CAE
co-actor co-actor
cC cI iC iI
REACTION TIME (ms)
Human Same 568 (13) 627 (15) 609 (13) 583 (13) 85 (12)
Different 585 (12) 607 (12) 585 (11) 589 (12) 17 (7)
Virtual Same 564 (12) 625 (13) 614 (12) 586 (11) 89 (11)
Different 583 (11) 605 (13) 596 (10) 597 (12) 21 (8)
ERROR (%)
Human Same 1.7 (0.9) 7.9 (1.7) 3.6 (1.2) 1.4 (0.6) 8.4 (2.2)
Different 1.7 (0.6) 4.9 (1.4) 1.9 (0.7) 4.4 (1.6) 0.8 (1.4)
Virtual Same 0.9 (0.5) 2.5 (0.7) 4.6 (1.0) 1.7 (0.8) 4.5 (1.3)
Different 2.3 (0.9) 3.8 (1.2) 2.7 (0.8) 4.1 (1.1) 0.1 (1.4)
Provided are means and standard errors of means for each design cell. The conflict
adaptation effect (CAE) is computed as a function of the effect of preceding compatibility
(c) or incompatibility (i) on current compatibility (C) or incompatibility (I).
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F(1, 25) = 11.61, p = 0.002, η
2
p = 0.32, were significant. The
main factors of type of other, F(1, 25) = 0.02, p > 0.8, η
2
p <
0.01, previous compatibility, F(1, 25) = 1.20, p > 0.2, η
2
p = 0.05,
and current compatibility, F(1, 25) = 0.31, p > 0.5, η
2
p = 0.01,
however, were not. The effect of time could be described as 2
bins with decelerating cardiac activity (of ca. 6.5ms) followed by
acceleration (of ca. 6.6ms). The effect of previous actor could be
interpreted as the effect of preparing to respond, which increased
deceleration by ca. 8.7ms. Previous actor also interacted with
time, F(2, 50) = 12.76, p < 0.001, showing a stronger effect in the
first two bins. More interestingly, time was found to interact with
type of other, F(2, 50) = 3.67, p = 0.03, with deceleration being
somewhat stronger in the second bin while being observed by the
virtual (7.3ms) as opposed to human (5.9ms) other—showing
that to some extent, participants were aware of or cared about by
whom they were observed.
However, the critical part of the analysis was in the
degree to which this effect related to conflict adaptation. We
found a significant interaction between preceding compatibility
and current compatibility, F(1, 25) = 4.85, p = 0.04,
η
2
p = 0.16, indicating a CAE. Furthermore, a significant
three-way interaction between preceding compatibility, current
compatibility, and time was observed, F(2, 50) = 14.41, p < 0.001,
η
2
p = 0.37, indicating the CAE changed over time. However,
the type of other did neither enter a three-way interaction with
previous x current compatibility, F(1, 25) = 0.53, p > 0.4, η
2
p =
0.02, nor enter a four-way interaction with previous × current
compatibility× time, F(2, 50) = 0.17, p > 0.8, η
2
p < 0.01. The first
two rows of Figure 4 show the direction of the effects described
(aggregated over the two types of others).
In the second scenario, we tested how the cardiac response
was affected while observing the co-acting other’s actions. Again,
time significantly affected the cardiac activity, F(2, 50) = 34.78,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.58, although here, there was no clear
deceleration: instead, acceleration—maximal in the second bin
(of 5.1ms)—was found. Previous actor likewise had a significant
effect, F(1, 25) = 57.80, p < 0.001, η
2
p = 0.69, with a change in
actor eliciting ca. 8.4ms of acceleration while a repetition (i.e.,
of non-participation) resulted in 4.4ms of deceleration. Previous
compatibility, F(1, 25) = 0.07, p > 0.7, η
2
p < 0.01, current
compatibility, F(1, 25) = 0.19, p > 0.6, η
2
p = 0.01, and type of
actor, F(1, 25) = 0.90, p > 0.3, η
2
p = 0.03, had no significant
main effect. No significant interactions were observed. Rows 3–6
in Figure 4 show the effects of a change in actor in this scenario
and provide a visual indication of the lack of overall effects of
different actors and compatibility.
Finally, in the third scenario, we tested the effects of passively
observing the other human co- acting with the virtual other.
However, an insignificant main effect of time, F(2, 50) = 1.08,
p = 0.31, η2p = 0.04, showed that the cardiac response could not
reliable be observed. Current, F(1, 25) = 0.14, p > 0.71, η
2
p <
0.01, and previous compatibility, F(1, 25) = 0.32, p > 0.5, η
2
p =
0.01, were insignificant, as was previous actor, F(1, 25) = 3.47,
p = 0.07, η2p = 0.12. Only one interaction effect in the entire
five factor ANOVAwas significant: time interacted with preceding
compatibility and previous actor, F(2, 50) = 4.66, p = 0.03, η
2
p
= 0.16. This showed that, particularly in the bin 2 and 3, after a
compatible trial, a change in actor elicited deceleration whereas a
repetition elicited acceleration.
Conclusion
The results of Experiment 2 are relatively clear-cut: the
knowledge that a preceding conflict was being experienced by
a real, as opposed to virtual, other had little if any effect.
Again, a strong conflict adaptation effect was observed after
self-experienced conflict. This effect was strongly reduced if the
preceding conflict was not experienced oneself, although not
completely eliminated. The question was whether the remainder
of the conflict adaptation, which we called the vicarious conflict
adaptation effect, was susceptible to the social relationship
between actor and co-actor. This was not the case: indeed, if
anything, the vicarious conflict adaptation effect was smaller
after observing a human-generated trial than after an automatic
(virtual) trial.
The effects of experiencing and observing conflict on cardiac
response converge with this finding, with little evidence that
actively (in scenario 2) or passively (in scenario 3) observing
another affected vicarious conflict adaptation. Indeed, while
observing, very little effect of conflict on cardiac response could
be found: All compatibility-related effects were removed as soon
as the trial did not concern the participant him- or herself. This
was true whether the participant was observing a human co-
actor’s trial or a virtual co-actor’s trial. The only effect that seemed
to be taken into account was whether a trial had a change in actor
or not, suggesting that participants did notice the trial-to-trial
changes. Even then, the cardiac response was found stronger in
trials during which they watched the virtual, as opposed to real,
human.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In the present study, we set out to investigate whether a
conflict adaptation effect (CAE) can be found not only within
individuals, but also between them. Throughout, we found clear
conflict (Simon) effects being reduced after incompatible trials.
ReplicatingWinkel and colleagues, we used a social variant of the
task, and showed that the CAE can be observed interindividually:
CAEs were found even after merely observing someone else’s
conflict. However, as we explained, various different models
of the sequential compatibility effects can account for conflict-
repetition effects, without necessarily invoking a role for higher
cognition such as executive control. The observation of an
incompletely reduced CAE therefore cannot in itself be taken as
positive evidence for a social dimension. Instead, evidence was
sought by investigating whether social factors co-vary with the
emergence of the proposed vicarious conflict adaptation effect.
In Experiment 1, we investigated whether correspondence
between one’s own action-effects and those caused by another
would change the vicarious conflict adaptation effect. In general,
when we perceive others as similar to us, we are more likely to
imitate their behavior (Weatherholtz et al., 2014). According to
various theories (e.g., Hurley, 2008), imitation and a range of
social cognitive functions are critically dependent on our ability
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FIGURE 4 | Effects of compatibility on cardiac response. The continuous, interpolated change in cardiac inter-beat interval (IBI) is shown for current compatible
(green) and incompatible (red) trials as a function of previous compatibility (left column: compatible; right column: incompatible). The first two rows show the effects in
one’s own active trial after one’s own (first row) or after someone else’s (second row) trial. The following four rows show the same, but in the absence of a response
(passive trials), and observing as either the real (human) or virtual (PC) other engages in the trial.
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to simulate observed actions using one’s own motor repertoire
and pre-motor cortex. Thus, we predicted, if the observable
effects resulting from someone else’s actions map more easily
onto those we generate ourselves, then observational learning
(somewhat similar to Iani et al., 2013) should be easier. As a
result, observed incompatibility should be more like one’s own
incompatibility, thus increasing the other-to-self (or vicarious)
conflict adaptation effect. No effect of effector, however, was
found, suggesting little regard for the difference between the
action-effects. Whether this means that observed conflict was
not vicarious remains hard to say: it is possible that the task
co-presentation was not sufficiently evocative (Ferraro et al.,
2012), or that the difference between action-effects was not salient
enough. On the other hand, if one observes conflict yet does not
take into regard how it is dealt with, the added explanatory value
of sociality becomes questionable.
Another possibility was that the vicarious conflict adaptation
in Experiment 1 never happened: perhaps, the participants’
knowledge of the co-actor being an artificial intelligence rather
than a real human being reduced the vicarious conflict adaptation
by itself. Using two screens and two participants, we changed the
experiment by allowing a real other, as well as the previously used
virtual other, to co-participate. Previous findings suggest that task
co-representation is affected by the social relationship between
co-actors (Mussi et al., 2015). Here, however, in terms of vicarious
conflict adaptation, no effect concerning the knowledge of the
co-actors real or artificial identity was observed. It may therefore
be that we observe and co-represent someone else’s task without
necessarily representing their conflict.
Of course, it is possible that the vicarious conflict adaptation
is automatically activated by the action correspondence—i.e., the
virtual hands in the present experiment. That is to say, even
though participants knew about the virtual other, perhaps they
still “cared” about its experience of conflict. Did our subjects
perhaps infer some sort of intentionality and a Theory of Mind
to the virtual hands, similar to the easy attribution of agency to
cartoons of simple line drawings (Abell et al., 2000; Gallagher
et al., 2000)? While possible, this explanation seems unlikely
given the cardiac IBI data, which only provided a clear effect of
the simple observation that a present trial was not one’s own trial.
At least in terms of autonomic activity, it seems that rather than
experiencing the observed conflict of another as one’s own, it is
instead quickly interpreted as “not my problem.”
It should be noted that our results on the influence of
observing someone else’s conflict on cardiac response are not
in line with previous evidence from functional MRI and
EEG. Winkel et al. (2012) showed remarkable overlap between
experiencing and observing conflict in frontal areas that have
previously been related to executive control. Likewise, Winkel
et al. (2009) show observed conflict to result in an event related
component that has previously been associated with attentional
control (Kopp et al., 1996; Stürmer et al., 2002). It is possible that
these cortical correlates are partially or even entirely unrelated
to conflict monitoring or resolution—after all, very different
psychological functions may involve the same neural structures,
an ambiguous situation which gives rise to the logical problem
of reverse inference (Poldrack, 2006; Spapé et al., 2015b). On
the other hand, it is possible that another’s conflict situation
is perceived and processed to some extent similar to a self-
encountered conflict, but not to the extent that it literally affects
the heart as much as it does the brain.
Indeed, one may argue that if we all fully process each other’s
conflict, we should have difficulty remaining passive. This is a
theoretical drawback common to theories that suggest observing
others is like personal action. The common coding of self and
other (Gallese and Goldman, 1998) may account for a plethora of
phenomena, like empathy, imitation (Iacoboni, 2009), language
production (Fogassi and Ferrari, 2007), autism (Oberman et al.,
2005), and so on. However, the vague boundaries between the
personal and interpersonal requires additional mechanisms to
account for abilities like self-other discrimination (Uddin et al.,
2006) and being able to not imitate (Brass et al., 2009). For our
present investigation, it is clear that no matter how their brain
processed the stimuli, people who observed another’s actions
were able to not imitate them and did not seem to be perturbed
by their observed conflict. In other words, to complementWinkel
et al. (2009): your conflict matters to me, but it is not my problem.
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